T H I S A R T I C L E examines Max
Weber's appraisal of Bismarck as a 'Caesarist' figure. An analysis of Weber's opinion of Bismarck serves, I submit, not only as a contribution to the history of a concept (Caesarism) whose importance in German political discourse between 1850-1917 has been admirably documented by Groh (1972) and Gollwitzer (1987) . It also helps to shed light on an area of Weber's thought of which we know comparatively little: his idea of illegitimacy. Moreover, insofar as Weber's advocacy of constitutional reform in Germany was framed against the backdrop of a negative estimation of Bismarck's legacy, it seems pertinent to subject that evaluation to close textual scrutiny *.
In what follows I will not attempt to provide a comprehensive account of 'Caesarism' in Weber's work. Hence I shall say nothing of substance on Weber's theory of Caesarism as it relates to charisma, as it appears in his writings on British parliamentarism and the American presidential system, or as it emerges in his reflections on the military. Space does not permit such license, and my focus must hence squarely be on Weber's perception of Bismarck. Nor will I claim that 'Caesarism' is to be envisaged as the 'central' concept of Weber's political sociology, a spatial metaphor which, though fashionable, seems to me disastrous as applied to theory (1). I believe only that Caesarism is an important and * M. A. ROMIEU, L'ere des Cesars (Paris, Ledoyen, 1850); D. GROH, Casarismus, etc., in O. BRUNNER et al. (eds) , Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe (Stuttgart, Ernst Klett, 1972) , I, pp. 726-71; H. GOLLWITZER, The Caesarism of Napoleon III as seen by public opinion in Germany, Economy and Society, XVI, 3: 357-4O4-Max WEBER, Gesammelte Politische Schriften 2 (Tubingen, Mohr, 1958) .
(1) Competition to find Weber's central d. Hennis (1983: 157): Weber's '"central" concept (not just in his political sociology interest was the specificity of modern Menhut, even more grandiosely, tout court) has schentum'; and e. Scaff (1984) . Scaff asks been fierce and a variety of pretenders have rhetorically: 'Is there a central concept, been thrust on the sociological public. From nodal point or idea [...] around which Wethese accounts Weber is so centripetal he is ber's thought develops' (199), and concludes implosive. For a sample, see a. Stark (1967: that there is, that of 'Arbeitsverfassung, the 261): 'Weber's thought is thoroughly consist-key theoretical term in Weber's major wrient. It is really and truly dominated by one tings from 1892-1894' (200). It should be pattern, the heterogony of purposes under-noted that, according to Scaff, 'The later stood in a negative sense. Weber's key to the texts are a reflection of the formative ideas' interpretation of world history is this pattern (193) . It goes without saying that many of and nothing else', emphasis in original; the individual observations made by these b. Tenbruck (1980: 343-4): the issue of ration-authors are valuable and stand on their own alization is 'the vital centre of Weber's merit. It is just that the extravagant dress in thinking'; c. Mueller (1982: 165) : the "polar which the propositions are clothed vitiates, opposites' of capitalism and socialism are rather than enhances, their plausibility. The 'the sole (sic) centre of Weber's thought'; spatial metaphor is 'disastrous' because the-understudied idea from which we can learn something of significance about a complex and subtle thinker who continues to tax our understanding, challenge our prejudices and test our intellectual honesty.
A. J. P. Taylor (1967: 22) has observed nicely that people 'live after their own deaths in the minds of others'. He might have added that there are some people whose spiritual longevity is assured through more than human recollection or the documentary evidence that testifies to their existence: these individuals live on in the institutions they have helped fashion, their influence evident long after they have been removed from office or have exhaled their last breath.
Such a person was Otto von Bismarck. As diplomatic wizard and consummate political strategist, as prime and directing author of the Second Empire's constitution, Bismarck and his supporters engaged themselves in that most formative and momentous of political endeavours, the act of shaping ' the lives of citizens by designing the structure or "dwelling" which they and their posterity will inhabit' (Wolin, 1981: 401) (2). It was a founding act whose significance was not lost on Max Weber, at any rate as he later reflected on it. For Weber the nationalist, who did not expect the historical realisation of an ideal to be wholesome or edifying, the achievement of German unification was a demonstrably necessary geo-political task to pursue, and Bismarck's role in that process cause for profound national gratitude. What appalled Weber from his late teens onwards, however, was Bismarck's management of the subsequent 'peace' (3), the grievous injuries inflicted on the fledgeling Reich in both domestic and foreign arenas by a regime Weber construed to be so self-serving and short-sighted as to mistake the interests of a world power with the survival of a totally anachronistic and irresponsible system of governance. Worse still, that system proved eminently capable of enduring in the absence of its original architect, thus underscoring the need for its institutional transformation.
Where Weber refers to Bismarck the charge of 'Caesarism' is never far away and the word is invariably inflected with animus. One can identify ories are composed of relations between ogy between the founders of states and the concepts, not structured as centre is to founders of sciences. periphery; and because the notion of a (3) According to Giddens (1972 In the first place, there was Bismarck's own variety of populism, particularly his initiative in introducing, or, to be exact, re-introducing universal manhood suffrage (4), though now extended to encompass the whole of the Reich. Reflecting on the implications for the German polity of the 1884 Reichstag election, the young Weber penned an intriguing letter to his uncle and confidant Hermann Baumgarten. Of course, what with the National Liberals' rightward shift under Johannes Miquel at the eleventh hour of the campaign and the failure of a union with the German Free Thought party to materialise 'the pathetic result', for the forces of liberalism 'was predictable'. 'Interesting', on the other hand, was the success of the Social Democrats in increasing their proportion of the votes cast from 6.1 (1881) to 9.7 per cent and as a consequence doubling their seats in the National Parliament from twelve to twentyfour (5): evidently Bismarck's anti-socialist legislation had failed to turn the tide of their support. After then remarking that a case could conceivably be constructed to support the anti-socialist laws on the grounds that Social Democratic agitation threatened to bring about a general curtailment of civil liberties by the state-better the few repressed than the many (6)-, Weber delivered his indictment of Bismarck in the following somewhat confusing, somewhat laboured metaphor: 'The capital mistake seems to be the Greek gift of Bismarckian Caesarism, universal suffrage, which is sheer murder of equal rights for all in the true sense of the word' (Weber, 1936: 143) (7).
Marianne Weber interprets this statement to constitute not so much an objection to the institution of universal manhood suffrage per se than evidence of Weber's distrust of the motives behind its implementation and timing: her husband-to-be, she tells us, 'disapproved of the symbol [as opposed to the existence?] of political equality of rights-apparently because it was Bismarck's original plan to use universal suffrage in the Reich to keep liberalism in check ' (1975: 118) .
There is probably something in this explanation, though exactly how much it is hard to determine with confidence. Certainly the twenty-yearold Weber, already remarkably politically astute, would have recognised Table 4 revised and extended version of articles of Koch (1984: 384-5 what he construed to be the ill-informed paranoia of those who nursed the 'superstition that dark and secret powers are at work in the labouring class' is symptomatic of his own less alarmist attitude towards the consequences of mass suffrage; while by the time of the Freiburg Inaugural lecture (May 1895) Weber's acceptance of the electoral presence of the proletariat is clear (it is their political 'immaturity' and 'philistinism' that he decries, not their electoral position and rights in the Reich) as, again, is his scorn for those who continue to be obsessed with the red peril (9). And, of course, during the Great War Weber is robust in demanding that all remaining impediments to the suffrage in Prussia be removed, outraged that the men who had fought for the fatherland might otherwise return to find themselves in the lowest of the Prussian three-class system (10). In fact it is in one of his wartime articles ('Suffrage and Democracy in Germany', originally published in December 1917) that Weber provides us with the best clue of his thinking about Bismarck's reintroduction and geographical extension of universal manhood suffrage (though naturally one cannot be sure that this was Weber's position at the time of his letter to Baumgarten). What Weber questions here is not the wisdom or necessity of affording the mass of the male population the right to vote, but rather the rapidity with which the process was inaugurated. Weber seems to have thought that the ideals of national parliamentary co-operation and responsibility would have been better served through a gradualist, evolutionary approach to political democratization, say, on British lines; specifically, through a process which would have first embraced the economically and socially privileged and the politically educated, only later ushering in the masses onto the political stage(n). However, this was not to be, the interests of the nation, as Weber perceived them, sacrificed to Bismarck's populist-Caesarism. Historically speaking, Bismarck's attempt at electoral manipulation formed only one part of his populist strategy and any full analysis of his career would want to consider among other things: his habit of dissolving the Reichstag when it refused to do his bidding, and appealing instead over its head directly to the voters (as in 1878, when the assassination attempt on the Emperor gave him the god-given opportunity to put the National Liberals in their place and come down like an avalanche on the growing socialist movement; or, as in 1887, when he determined to bully parliament into accepting his Appropriations Bill); his management of anti-Catholic feeling in the early-to-mid 1870s; and his part in the introduction of the famous social insurance legislation enacted throughout virtually the whole period of his chancellorship. Weber actually refers to some of these events, and to others I have not mentioned here, in 'Parliament and Government ' (1978a: 1388-90 = 1958: 303-6 ). But they largely fall under the wider rubric of Bismarck's 'demagogy', whereas the term 'Caesarism' is reserved more narrowly to capture one feature of the populist package-Bismarck's role in the foundation of universal male suffrage-and this is why I have accorded it the lion's share of my comments so far.
II
The second aspect of Bismarck's 'Caesarism' to earn Max Weber's rebuke is quite closely related to the first. It concerns the great man's towering stature and the shadow it casts over the Kaiserreich, enthralling supporters, intimidating opponents and, subsequently, awing the epigones. Writing just over two decades after Bismarck's death, Weber put the matter thus:
The present condition of our parliamentary life is a legacy of Prince Bismarck's long domination and of the nation's attitude toward him since the last decade of his chancellorship. This attitude has no parallel in the reaction of any other great people toward a statesman of such stature. Nowhere else in the world has even the most unrestrained adulation of a politician made a proud nation sacrifice its substantive convictions so completely (1978a: 1385 = 1958: 299). These comments are at first bound to strike us as just so much hyperbole, permissible no doubt in the context of a polemic but surely straining the credulity of the social scientist trained to be dubious of heroic conceptions of culture and society. Yet outright dismissal would be premature. For there is solid evidence to show that from the inception of his first Reich chancellorship onwards Bismarck came to be the object of an extraordinarily resilient and pervasive personality cult, the effects of which were as profound as they were to prove ultimately damaging. Bismarck's deeds only partially explain the elevation he enjoyed. Just as important was the context in which the man became hero, namely a Reich newly-forged and vigorously particularist in its social structure and in its political and cultural temperament: discounting Prussia, twenty-four governments composed the Empire, many of which remained hostile to Prussia's hegemony and extremely jealous of traditions (including confessional ones) and prerogatives they were determined to preserve. The new Empire, bereft of its own organic identity and lacking the collective symbols through which its unity might be affirmed (12), found in Bismarck its personalised surrogate-this is the plausible thesis advanced by Gordon Craig. And Craig shows how across the whole spectrum of German culture of the 1870s and 1880s and beyond-for instance, in the history of Treitschke, in the painting of Bocklin, Lenbach and Feuerbach, in the stories of Heyse, and, at the beginning of the twentieth century, in the sculpture of Begas, Lederer and Schaudtthe Bismarck myth grew, compensatory apotheosis of an uncertain Empire seeking social and emotional coherence (13).
Max Weber's own attitude towards Bismarck the person and Bismarck the legend are best treated separately. The Bismarck legend he quite simply detested. Bismarck the icon, 'Bismarck sans phrase ' (Marianne Weber, 1975: 118) , he denounced not just as an intellectual capitulation but a distortion of Bismarck's achievement by men who, in seeking to emulate his example, simultaneously misrepresented it through concentrating exclusively on 'the admixture of violence and cunning, the seeming or actual brutality of his political approach ' (1978a: 1385 = 1958: 299H14) . Weber's attitude to the man, however, was more complex. As I hinted at the beginning of Section I, Weber found much in Bismarck to admire. Weber appreciated the Chancellor's tactical adroitness and intellectual sophistication (his mental acuity, Weber would say, was often lost on admirers and detractors alike), perversely respected the sheer lack of humbug that accompanied his Machtpolitik. At the same time, Bismarck's ambition, his monomania and the political excesses it encouraged, had left the nation with the deepest scars. For Bismarck had bequeathed to his successors 'a nation without any political sophistication, far below the level which in this regard it had reached twenty years before (i.e. in 1870)'; 'a nation without any political will of its own, accustomed to the idea that the great statesman at the helm would make the necessary political decisions'; 'a nation accustomed to fatalistic sufferance of all decisions made in the name of "monarchic government", because he had misused monarchic sentiments as a cover for his power interests in the struggle of the parties'; 'a nation unprepared to look critically at the qualification of those who settled down in his empty chair'. Furthermore: Weber's censoriousness, deeply felt, and powerful as it is, has to be treated with some care in a study part of whose aim is to clarify political nomenclature; we cannot simply assume that every article on the above list of condemnation amounts to a specifically 'Caesarist' attribute. (1958: 233); then, increasingly terrorised by their own insecurity, they had come to accept willingly their own subaltern status within the Reich, reconciled to a regime 'half "Caesarist", half "patriarchal" ' (1971: 31) whose existence was severely detrimental to the nation's political education (18). When, many years later, Weber returned to the relationship between Bismarck and the bourgeoisie, his treatment is noticeably different, at least in emphasis. Musing in 'Parliament and Government' on what he called the 'Reichstag's prime period', by which he meant the prime period of German liberalism (19), the bourgeoisie's political leadership is dealt with sympathetically and respectfully, in sharp contrast to the hectoring the bourgeois class has received in the earlier Freiburg lecture. These leaders, predominantly National Liberal in affiliation, had been candid enough to admit Bismarck's 'tremendous intellectual superiority' without thereby abdicating their political responsibility. For while Weber recalled hearing liberal big-wig guests of his parents opining that 'they would consider Caesarism-government by a genius-the best political organisation for Germany, if there would always be a new Bismarck' (1978a: 1387 =1958: 302) (20), the point of this reminiscence is to insist that these same people had no illusions about such a phenomenon occurring. They had therefore attempted to secure a strong parliamentary and party system capable of 'attracting great political talents', and capable of providing political stability and continuity; moreover, many of the most vibrant Reich institutions, such as the office of the Imperial Chancellor, the creation of the Reichsbank and the unification of the civil code, had been born of the liberal parliamentary initiatives (1978a: 1387-8 =1958: 302-3). That they failed to wrest power from the Bismarck system, in which they were so enmeshed, was due to more than the anachronistic aspects of their economic and social policy: it was ultimately because Bismarck himself had successfully stimied every attempt to involve parliament in government. Evidently, then, Weber did not believe that the bourgeoisie's political immaturity was due to the puerility of that class' professed representatives (21). On causality that occurs between the Freiburg the contrary, history had vindicated the National Liberals' sense of political foreboding, a fact Weber sought to ram-home to those whom he saw as the far less percipient members of the contemporary middle class: 'a Caesarist figure like Bismarck ' (1978a: 1452 = 1958: 382) , and a 'Caesarist regime ' like his (1978a: 1413 = 1958: 335) were rare occurrences-'At best, a genius appears once in several centuries ' (1978a: 1387 = 1958 : 301)-and it was time the nation grew up and threw off a state-system ripe not for a Bismarckian epiphany, but fertile only for posturing literati, for an histrionic Kaisar intoxicated on his own vanity and for an arthritic, token parliamentarism constitutionally destitute of the capacity to exercise real power and responsible leadership.
Ill
I come now to the third reproach that Weber levelled against Bismarck's 'Caesarism'. This was the criticism that there was something improper about his rule, something illegitimate about it. Recall that this was another of the accusations on Bismarck's charge-sheet that Weber recited above when he declared that Bismarck 'misused monarchic sentiments as a cover for his power interests in the struggle of the parties'. Or, if that statement is not explicit enough in binding together the elements of Bismarckian governance, illegitimacy and Caesarism, then consider Weber's comment that 'one of the worst legacies of Bismarck's rule has been the fact that he considered it necessary to seek cover for his Caesarist regime behind the legitimacy of the monarch ' (1978a: 1413 = 1958: 335 , emphasis in German original omitted)(22), a remark which seems to make the affinity sufficiently transparent. The observation thas Caesarism involves an illegitimate form of rule was not of itself an original or isolated insight. Auguste Romieu (whom Weber never mentions), author of the first treatise on Caesarism, made a similar claim (Romieu, 1850: 130-1, 193-4, 200) ; so did Wilhelm Roscher (1892: 588-611). Brockhaus, too, is clear on this point (23), as is Tonnies (1917: 210) : in the notes-cum-glossary appended to his book on the English and German states, he tells us that 'Caesarism'(after Julius Caesar) is a form of state in which a leader of the people (usually a leader of the army) sets himself up as a sole ruler (Alleinherrscher)', adding immediately afterwards in parenthesis: 'Illegitimate or irregular monarchy' (24). However, while most sources, to the best of my knowledge, discuss the issue of illegitimacy primarily with an eye to the Napoleonic example, Weber is unusual in thinking out his idea in relation to the two Napoleons and Bismarck also (though not just them). What was the connection between these men and their regimes? We are given some clues in a tricky passage in 'Parliament and Government' which I will now quote and then do my best to interpret. Because of the importance of this passage, notable for the plethora of references to Caesarism it contains, I propose to quote it at some length.
The context of Weber's discussion is the issue of 'the relationship between democracy and parliamentarism':
Active mass democratization means that the political leader is no longer proclaimed a candidate because he has proved himself in a circle of honoratiores, then becoming a leader because of his parliamentary accomplishments, but that he gains the trust and the faith of the masses in him and his power with the means of mass demagogy. In substance, this means a shift toward the Caesarist mode of selection. Indeed, every democracy tends in this direction. After all, the specifically Caesarist technique is the plebiscite. It is not an ordinary vote or election, but a profession of faith in the calling of him who demands these acclamations. The Caesarist leader rises either in a military fashion, as a military dictator like Napoleon I, who had his position affirmed through a plebiscite; or he rises in the bourgeois fashion: through plebiscitary affirmation, acquiesced in by the army, of a claim to power on the part of a non-military politician, such as Napoleon III. Both avenues are as antagonistic to the parliamentary principle as they are (of course) to the legitimism of the hereditary monarchy. Every kind of direct popular election of the supreme ruler and, beyond that, every kind of political power that rests on the confidence of the masses and not of parliamentthis includes also the position of a popular military hero like Hindenburg-lies on the road to these 'pure' forms of Caesarist acclamation. In particular, this is true of the position of the President of the United States, whose superiority over parliament derives from his (formally) democratic nomination and election. The hopes that a Caesarist figure like Bismargk attached to universal suffrage and the manner of his antiparliamentary demagogy also point in the same direction, although they were adapted, in formulation and phraseology, to the given legitimist conditions of his ministerial position. The circumstances of Bismarck's departure from office demonstrate the manner in which hereditary legitimism reacts against these Caesarist powers. Every parliamentary democracy eagerly seeks to eliminate, as dangerous to parliament's power, the plebiscitary methods of leadership selection (1978a: 1451-2 = 1958: 381-2, emphases in German original).
From this dissertation we learn at least something about the genus of Caesarism, modelled on the Napoleonic experience, and its Bismarckian species, but the level of abstraction at which the analysis is pitched is regrettably stratospheric. And what of Bismarck? Glossing somewhat, his mode of selection is 'civil' (he is called on by his monarch to become minister president, and though a strategist is not a general) (25); his mode of acclamation is plebiscitary (albeit in the most loose and unsatisfying of senseshistorians will wince at Weber's procrustean tendencies): he is a 'demagogue' who leads from the front and who is willing and able to dissolve parliament and appeal directly to the people for support of his policies (26); his relation to parliament is antagonistic, particularly when it will not succumb to his commands and then Bismarck countenances coups d 'etat (27) ; his relation to the Hohenzollern dynasty is uneasy in that, despite constitutional authority ultimately residing in the Emperor, it is Bismarck himself, ostensible agent of the sovereign, who in fact rules the Reich (a situation Wilhelm 11 would eventually rudely correct) (28) So it is that Bismarck can be reckoned, in Weber's account, the embodiment of Caesarism. Yet one ambiguity remains; it concerns this question of Caesarist illegitimacy. In Economy and Society, though not only there, Weber deals with the two Bonapartes under the rubric of charisma, also presenting the idea of Caesarism as a sociological sub-type of his famous leadership concept. Now, as we know, charisma happens to be one of Weber's trinity of legitimate domination, leading one to ask: how is it logically possible for Caesarism to be designated as illegitimate in one context (the discussion of the Bonapartes in 'Parliament and Government') and yet; tacitly related to charismatic legitimacy in another (29)? The answer is probably that Weber, quite simply, is using the concept of legitimacy to mean different things. Caesarism is i/legitimate only in the constitutional sense that it is a type of rule devoid of a hereditary, dynastic foundation. Constitutionally speaking, then, a Bourbon, Habsburg or Hohenzollern monarch could never be labelled 'Caesarist' (30), nor could any other monarchy of venerable standing. By contrast Caesarism necessarily assumes the stamp of legitimacy if we look at it from a sociological angle (31): here it is legitimate to the extent that it elicits from a group of people, who believe in the moral authority of the Caesarist leader's mission, their voluntary compliance: Weber says as much in his remark that 'Active mass democratization means that the political leader [...] gains the trust and the faith of the masses in him', etc. Hence, once this dual meaning of 'legitimacy' is comprehended, the seeming incongruity of Weber's formulations evaporates.
IV
Since Weber's death in 1920, 'Caesarism' has gradually lost its familiarity and fluency as a political term; to the educated political public of today, the word is virtually meaningless, irrelevant. Nonetheless, as a technical, didactic term, 'Caesarism' has endured. Attempts to 'operationalise' it were evident, for instance, in the work of Gerth and Mills (1954: 210) who envisioned Caesarism as a species of 'oriental despotism', or in that of Franz Neumann (1964 ed.: 233-56) , for whom Caesarism was but one of a triad of dictatorships [the other two he called 'simple' and 'totalitarian'], notable for its mass base and quintessentially personal dimension. More recently, neo-Gramscians like Stuart Hall and Bill Schwarz have found employment for the term. For Hall (1983: 309-21) and Schwarz (1985: 33-62) , Caesarism is to be equated with coalitionist, compromise governments born of a crisis of parliamentary representation in which no social class has been able to assert its political supremacy. (In addition, 'Caesarism' has also had its attractions for those predisposed towards philosophy of history: one thinks of Amaury de Riencourt's The Coming Caesars (1958) , where Caesarism-the culmination of a long process of social evolution and cyclical development in which American 'Civilisation' has triumphed over European 'Culture'-is depicted as the organic accretion of power condensed in the American Presidential office). This is not the occasion to review such contributions, nor comment on the controversy regarding how far the Bonapartist regimes (particularly that of Napoleon ill) and that of Bismarck's were in fact comparable political formations (32). That would take me too far away from my immediate subject: Max Weber's view of Bismarck. To be sure, Bismarck was not the only person to be called 'Caesarist' by Weber-the two Bonapartes (as we saw in III above), Lloyd George, Gladstone, Pericles, Cleon and Lassalle were all to enjoy that dubious honour (33); but, in the end, it is the Iron Chancellor who supremely holds this title. No-one, not even the Bonapartes, is referred to as Caesarist more often than he. I have shown that through this designation Weber represented Bismarck as a populist, awesome and illegitimate figure. By studying Weber's use of language we can learn much about his own preoccupations (cf. Ste. Croix, 1972: 358) . On the other hand, whether Caesarism is itself an empirically helpful term to represent Bismarck's governance (or any other, for that matter) is a very different question and one that will continue to provoke historical and sociological debate*. 
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